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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FOREWORD:
COMPETITION’S ACHILLES HEEL

THOMAS L. GREANEY*
The Achilles heel of competition is concentration. Markets dominated by a
single or a few buyers or sellers protected by barriers to entry do not perform
efficiently. In the health care sector, market imperfections and extensive
regulation further complicate matters, as conventional economic analyses need
to account for their distortive effects. 1 Often misunderstood as the guarantor of
competitive market conditions, antitrust law has only a constrained role to play
in dealing with the problem of what I refer to as “extant market power.” 2 That
is, where mergers or organic growth has resulted in highly concentrated market
structures (e.g., three or fewer rivals)—as is the case in many health provider
and payor markets—antitrust law is largely tolerant of high prices unless those
in dominant positions collude or abuse their market position by exclusion or
other improper means. Moreover, economic analyses indicate that some
important accretions in market power occur in circumstances that have largely
escaped antitrust challenge, e.g., vertical cross-market combinations, have the
potential to cause significant harm to consumers. 3
The resulting challenge for health care competition policy is finding ways
to curb the exercise of extant market power and, where possible, to expand the
capacity of antitrust or regulatory measures that inhibit the ability to obtain
dominance. There are, to be sure, reasons to question the advisability of some of
the ad hoc measures undertaken by antitrust enforcers and state legislatures to
address provider market power. For example, some state attorneys general have
negotiated so-called “conduct remedies” that allow mergers by dominant
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of Law and Distinguished
Senior Fellow, UCSF/UC Hastings Consortium on Law, Science and Health Policy.
1. See MARTIN GAYNOR ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST., MAKING HEALTH CARE MARKETS
WORK: COMPETITION POLICY FOR HEALTH CARE, ACTIONABLE POLICY PROPOSALS FOR THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH, CONGRESS, AND THE STATES 1–2 (Apr. 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2017/04/gaynor-et-al-final-report-v11.pdf; Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s
Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 857–58 (2004).
2. Thomas L. Greaney, Coping with Concentration, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1564, 1565 (2017).
3. Glenn A. Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Hospital Prices Increase in California, Especially
Among Hospitals in the Largest Multi-Hospital Systems, 53 INQUIRY 1, 5 (2016). See generally
Jaime S. King & Erin C. Fuse Brown, The Anti-Competitive Potential of Cross-Market Mergers in
Health Care, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y ORIG-PG, PINCITE (2017).
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hospitals to go forward while imposing certain restrictions on the behavior of
the merged entity. These remedial provisions have included restrictions on
raising prices to commercial insurers, promises that the merged entity will
negotiate in “good faith,” and provisions that require the merging parties to
employ “separate and independent” negotiating teams when contracting with
payors. 4 These home remedies are in my view inherently flawed. Besides the
difficulty of crafting ex ante solutions, they are difficult for government agencies
to implement and monitor, and do not address entrenched market power;
moreover, there are issues of institutional competence in investing regulatory
supervision over a complex and rapidly changing business environment in
courts, as one state court acknowledged in refusing to accept such a decree. 5
Another deeply flawed approach adopted in several states is the
establishment of regulatory agencies that issue certificates of public advantage
(COPAs) that immunize anti-competitive mergers while subjecting the merged
hospital to regulatory controls on price and a variety of other matters. The
standards for approving mergers under these statutes are numerous, conflicting,
and not subject to empirical analysis or measurement and hence subject to risks
of capture by the regulated entity. 6 Moreover, the nation’s experience with
certificate of need and rate regulation of hospital charges counsels against
adopting open-ended rate regulation in this manner. Application of state COPA
statutes have caused the Federal Trade Commission to abandon antitrust
challenges to mergers to near monopoly in West Virginia 7 and the TennesseeVirginia border area. 8
Some states are turning to capping provider rates using supervisory
regulation of commercial insurance. Regulatory approaches range from openended regulation of insurance rates designed to intensify payors’ resistance to
provider price increases to more targeted designs that cap the prices of dominant

4. Greaney, supra note 2, at 1566.
5. See Commonwealth v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. SUCV2014–02033–BLS2,
2015 WL 500995, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2015) (“This Court is ill-equipped to keep abreast
of . . . changes [in health care pricing] as they unfold . . . . [T]here is reason to doubt that this Court
has the technical competence or resources required to resolve the disputes that are certain to arise
under this consent decree . . . .”).
6. For example, the West Virginia COPA statute lists nine goals, nine benefits, and four
disadvantages to be considered by the regulatory board. See W. VA. CODE § 16-29B-28 (2017);
Greaney, supra note 2, at 1567.
7. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Dismisses Complaint Challenging Merger of
Cabell Huntington Hospital and St. Mary’s Medical Center (July 6, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2016/07/ftc-dismisses-complaint-challenging-merger-cabell-hun
tington (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
8. See Alex Kacik, Mountain States, Wellmont Skirt Federal Regulation and Score State
Merger Approval, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Nov. 3, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20171103/NEWS/171109954 (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
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providers. 9 Other states are exploring more thoroughgoing regulation including
single-payor options. 10 This newfound enthusiasm for rate regulation, notably
visible even in some red states, underscores the fact that market power has
become a central issue in health law and policy.
This symposium brings together an impressive collection of individuals
from academic, public policy, and legal practice sectors to examine the issue of
concentration in health care. 11 The articles include several taking a close look at
the promise and gaps in antitrust enforcement. Anne Marie Helm provides a
thorough overview of the hurdles faced by private litigants in bringing antitrust
lawsuits. 12 Jaime King and Erin Fuse Brown dissect an important phenomenon
yet to be addressed by antitrust enforcement, the creation of “system” market
power by cross-market mergers. 13 A second theme of the symposium is the
interplay of regulation and competition policy in health care. Emilio Varanini
offers insights as to the role of state legislation, regulation, and law enforcement
in buttressing the effectiveness of market competition in serving the public
good. 14 Zack Buck takes a close look at the rapid emergence of managed care in
Medicaid, analyzing the bidding processes used to inject competition into the
program and the regulation and litigation encountered in several states that
employed competitive bidding. 15 Finally, Robert Berenson delves into the
regulatory structures governing traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage, 16
an issue that was front and center in the government’s successful challenge to
the merger of Aetna and Humana. 17 His analysis reveals the central role
regulation plays in shaping competition in Medicare Advantage and raises
important issues regarding the advisability of converting Medicare to a premium
support system.

9. See Greaney, supra note 2, at 1568–69.
10. See Melanie Mason, The Debate Over Single-Payer Healthcare in California Isn’t Going
Away. Here’s Why, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-singlepayer-politics-20170827-story.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
11. Video Recording: Coping with Health Care Market Concentration, ST. LOUIS U. CTR. FOR
HEALTH L. STUD. (Apr. 7, 2017), http://law.slu.edu/HLsymposium2017.
12. Anne Marie Helm, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care, 11 ST.
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y ORIG-PG, PINCITE (2017).
13. Jaime S. King & Erin C. Fuse Brown, The Anti-Competitive Potential of Cross-Market
Mergers in Health Care, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y ORIG-PG, PINCITE (2017).
14. Emilio Varanini, Competition as Policy Reform: The Use of Vigorous Antitrust
Enforcement, Market-Governance Rules, and Incentives in Health Care, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y ORIG-PG, PINCITE (2017).
15. Isaac D. Buck, Managing Medicaid, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y ORIG-PG,
PINCITE (2017).
16. Robert A. Berenson, When is Competition Not Competition: The Curious Case of
Medicare Advantage, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y ORIG-PG, PINCITE (2017).
17. See United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017).
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This symposium marks the end of my twenty-nine year career at Saint Louis
University. In that time, I have had the opportunity to interact with some of the
leading scholars, practitioners, and policy experts in some twenty-nine health
law symposia. Further it has been both a pleasure and an honor to work with my
wonderful faculty colleagues and outstanding students in building and
maintaining the nation’s leading health law center. I am grateful to all for their
friendship and support.

